Replace a participant.

This illustrative observation exchange connects independently operated applications. Replacing a participant still takes interface engineering; identity and authorization mechanisms can be reused without inventing a new trust model for each integration.

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A fielded publisher. A new recipient.

A sensor service exposes observations over an existing HTTP interface. Another operator’s mission application needs those observations in its own format. A maintenance application has a valid identity, but has no reason to participate in this exchange.

Illustrative service connectionApplication traffic
An existing observation feed reaches a separately operated mission application Under the sensor operator, an integration adapter reads an existing HTTP observation feed and maps its output. The adapter sends through a local QHx client proxy with the adapter workload identity. An authenticated encrypted connection reaches the mission operator’s server proxy, which permits the adapter identity and forwards to the mission application. The adapter sees plaintext; its identity does not establish authenticated origin at the original sensor. Sensor operatorMission operator Fielded observation publisher Existing HTTP feed Integration adapterReads plaintext · maps the output Local HTTP QHx client proxyAdapter workload identity Receiving mission application Local HTTP QHx server proxyAdapter identity permitted Authenticated,encrypted connection

Sensor operator

Fielded observation publisher

↓ Existing HTTP feed

Integration adapterReads plaintext and maps the output

↓ Local HTTP

QHx client proxyAdapter workload identity

Authenticated, encrypted connection

Mission operator

QHx server proxyAdapter identity permitted

↓ Local HTTP

Receiving mission application
Another requesterMaintenance application× Connection refusedIts identity is outside the receiving proxy’s allowed set.
Boxes group administrative responsibility. Arrows show the forward application path; the middle leg is the authenticated, encrypted proxy connection. The adapter is application-specific integration. Object protection and request recording are separate arrangements.

The application contract

An authorized adapter reads the publisher’s output, maps the agreed fields and sends the result to the receiving interface. The teams define units, schema versions, error handling and what to do with incomplete observations. The adapter processes plaintext and implements application-specific handling rules.

Its QHx identity identifies the registered adapter workload. If the original feed lacks authenticated origin, the adapter does not turn it into a cryptographically signed statement by the sensor.

The operator’s controls

Each operator configures identity issuance and accepted trust material. The proxies mutually authenticate their connection using TLS. The receiving proxy accepts the adapter’s identity and refuses the maintenance identity. Local listeners and direct routes to the applications need their own protection.

Evaluation observes the permitted exchange and the refused connection, including an attempt to bypass the proxy. These are the results to establish for this illustrative integration.

Then the receiving application changes.

Treating the kill chain as a distributed system changes the engineering question: when a participant changes, which interfaces and permissions must change with it—and which parts of the system can remain intact?

The publisher stays in service. A replacement recipient introduces a new interface, identity or deployment environment. The integration team reviews each part of the exchange to determine what needs to change and what can be reused.

Part of the exchangeReview and updatePotentially reusable
Application contractAdapter mapping, output schema and error behavior.The fielded publisher and its existing interface.
Identity and service pathDestination, registrations, accepted peer identities and network rules.Issuance services, proxy mechanisms and policy structure.
OperationDeployment artifacts, validation and recovery procedures.The test approach and the team’s recorded operating knowledge.

A matching API or service identity can reduce the work. After the change, re-test permitted and refused access, credential renewal and the path around the proxy. Examine established sessions separately from new connection attempts.

Inspect the identities and receiving configuration →

Two audiences on shared infrastructure.

Consider two synthetic reports at the same classification level, with different partner-release or mission audiences. Both use a common broker in an environment approved to handle them. This illustrative CABE path preserves distinct access without assuming a separate broker, issuing service and Key Service for each audience.

Agree on meaning and handling.
The information authority establishes the handling of Reports A and B. The publisher assigns the corresponding Attribute Sets and encrypts with authorized key material. The receiving teams agree on schema versions, units, interfaces and Attribute meanings. CABE protects the Attribute Set and Lease Reference in its Envelope headers; it does not establish that the publisher chose the correct handling or hide all metadata.
Enforce each decision at its own point.
The configured QHx proxy authenticates a peer and controls its service connection. The CABE Key Service separately authenticates its client, establishes its Principal and applies Policy to key requests. In this arrangement, the broker holds ciphertext without payload keys; application A is authorized for Report A and application B for Report B. A permitted broker connection does not grant either application the other report’s key, authorize information release or authorize an operational action.
Establish the permitted and refused cases.
Start with recipients that hold no usable prior keys. Request Report A’s key as application A and Report B’s key as application B, then make the two cross-audience requests. The intended result is two permitted requests and two refusals at the Key Service. Also try an unapproved identity and a route around the proxy. Altered protected headers or ciphertext must fail integrity verification. These are proposed checks, not reported test results.

When the recipient changes

Review the adapter, output schema, registration, service restrictions, key-access Policy and release approval. The approved broker, issuance services, Key Service and proxy mechanisms are candidates for reuse where their interfaces, capacity and handling remain suitable. Reusing them does not transfer the previous recipient’s permissions. Record what changed and repeat the permitted, refused and integrity checks.

Refusal of a fresh key request does not erase earlier keys or plaintext, and a Key Service request record does not record every later local decryption. Specify cached-key and credential lifetimes, policy propagation, failure behavior and recovery. Required isolation and boundary controls remain in place; encryption neither declassifies a report nor approves its placement on arbitrary infrastructure.

Illustrative application pattern

The mechanisms are defined in CABE’s architecture, Envelope format and key access protocol. For identity recognition across organizations, SPIFFE federation is distinct from permission to obtain a key.

Examine the separate object-protection path →

Local operation after reach-back is lost.

The observation service and receiving application still have a local network. Their link to a remote operating site has gone. What remains usable depends on where the required services run, what they depend on and which trust material the peers still accept.

  1. Place the dependencies.

    The operator places required application and QHx services locally, provides storage and time, and prepares trust bundles and policy before disconnection. Identify the remote authority or service that becomes unavailable and measure how long each dependency remains usable.

  2. Separate continuity from restart.

    Local proxies use the configured paths, policy and accepted trust material. A local issuing service can renew credentials while its own dependencies and attestation path remain available; otherwise operation is bounded by the credentials and sessions the peers still accept. Test a running exchange separately from a node restart, new identity issuance, credential renewal and a fresh key request.

  3. Establish recovery.

    Disconnect the remote link while retaining the local network. On reconnection, refresh trust and policy and verify recovery. If the application depends on a queue, also test restart recovery, acknowledgments, duplicates and expiry. An in-memory buffer is not durable delivery.

Illustrative application pattern

Plan local dependencies and recovery →

Service evidence

For supported AI interactions, QHx Notary can retain signed request records linked to workload statements. An independent reviewer examines captured content and the signer after the service has stopped. Model correctness and missing captures require separate evaluation.

Request evidence and verification →

Configuration authority

QHx signed resources bind a configuration bundle to an accepted signer and version. The destination checks the signature and retained version state before applying it. Test changed content, unaccepted signers, older versions and recovery of that state.

Signed configuration changes →